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Allocating Scarce Water Resources:Examining if Price Differentials Exist in a Prior
Appropriations Setting
Abstract
This study examines the potential for a water leasing market within one singular basin in Southwestern,
New Mexico. The goal of this research is to test the feasibility of a water market in the river basin and
determine if price differentials are found in a prior appropriations setting. This was done through a
laboratory experiment to test if participants would simulate an effective water leasing market in a basin
within New Mexico. In order to assess the potential for a water leasing market, a water leasing market
was designed to incorporate the hydrologic, engineering, institutional, and economic market of the Upper
Mimbres Basin (Broadbent et. al., 2009). Using experimental economics, which uses computer programs
and simulation to test an economic theory, the market value of water was induced through the set up of
the experiment. The set up involved double auction where all bids and offers are presented publically and
each bid and offer is presented simultaneously. The advantages of conducting a laboratory experiment is
predominantly time, data that would usually take a year to collect can be done in a short amount of time.
By simulating the water leasing market we can test participants’ reactions to drought conditions, which
could take years to occur in the real setting of New Mexico.
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Allocating Scarce Water Resources:Examining if
Price Differentials Exist in a Prior
Appropriations Setting
Hayley Harroun
I. INTRODUCTION
The Southwestern United States is an arid
region with significantly low levels of precipitation. This
region not only has a limited water supply, but also
consequently has a large percentage of population
growth. From 1965 to 2000 population has increased
by 80 percent (Konieczki and Heilman, 2004). With the
population increasing from year to year, as a result, there
has also been an increase in the demand for water. This
is seen in the withdrawal rate of water for domestic
use, which has increased by 64 percent (Konieczki and
Heilman, 2004). While a growing population increases
the demand for water use among humans, a majority
of the water supply still goes towards irrigation for
agriculture. The demand for water is not the only
increasing factor, but temperatures over the last century
have increased 1.5 degrees Fahrenheit around the globe
(United States Environmental Protection Agency, 2012).
The warming climate has impacted, for example, the
natural flow of the Colorado River, which supplies water
to a large portion of the arid Southwestern region of the
United States (United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 2012). Future prospective droughts due to
climate change and an increasing population have the
potential to create conflicts over water supplies, which
is amplified by the nature of the water rights in the
Southwest.
The water right laws in the Southwest differ
from the rest of the country (i.e. riparian rights). In the
western United States the predominant water law is
known as the Doctrine of Prior Appropriations.This law
was a response to the arid climate and has been in
existence since the settlement of the west.The concept
of prior appropriations states that water can be set aside
for “beneficial use”, which is an ambiguous term (Fort,
2002). Prior appropriations give senior users the first
claim to the water in the times of a drought. A drought
is commonly referred to as a call. Therefore, leasing of
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water rights amongst senior users and juniors, those with
secondary claims on the water source, during times of
drought has been proposed. Water leasing, also known
as water banking, provides a temporary transfer of water
rights, which could provide a market for smaller water
users who need to buy water for irrigation purposes in
times of drought. One possible problem could arise in a
water market under a prior appropriations setting. As a
result, the price differentials occur where higher prices
are paid for “senior” water rights vs. “junior” water rights
as defined by Libecap (2005).
In cases of water scarcity, consideration for a
water market is necessary especially if the watershed
is over allocated. This is supported at the state and
national level. On the national level, the Department of
the Interior (2005) discussed the issue of water scarcity
in their report entitled Water 2025: Preventing Crises
and Conflict in the West. Many states have drafted
plans to address issues in water management. These
state level water plans have been drafted by: California,
New Mexico, Nevada, Utah, and Wyoming. (California
Department of Water Resources, 2012; New Mexico
Office of the State Engineer, 2009; State of Nevada
Division of Water Resources, 2011; Utah Division of
Water Resources, 2001; Wyoming Water Development
Office, 2007). The water scarce region of the western
United States has consistently increased its demand for
water despite limited water supplies. This points to a
need for improved water allocation mechanisms, such
as water leasing markets.
The inefficiencies of water allocation can be
addressed through two market institutions: permanent
water rights transfer or the leasing of water rights.
Permanent transfer of water rights is an established
practice in the west. Los Angeles would not exist today
without the purchase and transfer of water rights from
the Owens Valley. Water leasing markets, on the other
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hand, are a newly emerging market institution. Water
leasing provides a temporary transfer of water rights,
which would provide a market for smaller water users
who need water for irrigation purposes (Shupe et. al.,
1989).
This study examines the potential for a
water leasing market within one singular basin in
Southwestern, New Mexico. The goal of this research
is to test the feasibility of a water market in the river
basin and determine if price differentials are found in
a prior appropriations setting. This was done through
a laboratory experiment to test if participants would
simulate an effective water leasing market in a basin
within New Mexico. In order to assess the potential
for a water leasing market, a water leasing market was
designed to incorporate the hydrologic, engineering,
institutional, and economic market of the Upper Mimbres
Basin (Broadbent et. al., 2009). Using experimental
economics, which uses computer programs and
simulation to test an economic theory, the market
value of water was induced through the set up of the
experiment. The set up involved double auction where
all bids and offers are presented publicly and each bid
and offer is presented simultaneously.The advantages of
conducting a laboratory experiment is predominantly
time, data that would usually take a year to collect can
be done in a short amount of time. By simulating the
water leasing market we can test participants’ reactions
to drought conditions, which could take years to occur
in the real setting of New Mexico.
The data from two trials (each simulating a
year’s worth of transactions) were studied. From these
experiments, individual transactions are recorded
including the stakeholders involved in the trade, the
quantity of water traded, price of water traded and
the impacts on the hydrologic model. It is, therefore,
hypothesized that stakeholders will fulfill their assigned
roles under the experimental leasing system (the market
price will be equal to the expected market price) and
there will be a price differential between senior and
junior user’s water rights during times of a call. The
focus of this research is firstly is to test whether the
experimental market follows realistic expectations and
secondly to examine the benefits of instituting a water
leasing market within the river basin.
II. LITERATURE REVIEW
Broadbent et al. (2009) summarize the
literature on water leasing markets. Their article
establishes the need for water leasing markets in the

west, the barriers to establishing water leasing markets,
and past theoretical and empirical studies on water
leasing markets.
Permanent transfer of water rights, have been
studied for almost forty years. Literature regarding
permanent transfer of water rights has outlined criteria
essential for successful water market transactions.
Broadbent et al. (2009) outline the criteria as “1) welldefined, securable, and tradable property rights; 2)
hydrologic and engineering reality; 3) environmental
quality; 4) social/community and traditional uses; 5)
transaction costs; and 6) third-party effects” (p. 713).
Third party effects are resolved through the adoption of
the “no-injury” rule, transactions that economically harm
third parties cannot occur. Typically, transaction costs
are higher in water markets and therefore addressing
third party effects is necessary to create a successful
water leasing market. Water markets must acknowledge
traditional water uses such as Native American rights
to water as well as the environmental impacts of water
leasing on the watershed. Understanding the hydrologic
and engineering reality of a watershed will not only
determine the feasibility of trading water in specific
locations but also address the impacts on the watershed.
Above all, well-defined property rights encourage right
holders’ to act in their own self-interest.
Theoretical studies on water leasing markets
have acknowledged it as “an attractive option for
both parties because it maintains continuity, preserves
ownership by holder of the right for future use, and
accommodates an intermediate use” (Shupe et al.
1989). Empirical studies have been conducted in the
Western United States (Yoskowitz, 1999; Czetwertynski,
2002; Yoskowitz, 2002; Loomis et.al., 2003; Adams et. al.,
2004; Howitt, 2005; Brown, 2006; Brewer et.al., 2007),
as well as southeastern Australia (Crase et.al, 2000;
Bjornlund, 2003, 2004; Crase, et. al., 2004; Turra et. al.,
2005), and Southern Chile (Hadjigeorgalis, 2004). These
studies show that water leasing has received national
and international attention. Studying the literature on
water leasing markets establishes a basis to study waterleasing markets.
A recent article by Basta and Colby (2010)
examine the trends of water markets for leasing and
permanent transfers. Basta and Colby expand the
literature on water markets through the compilation
of the monthly water transactions reported from 1987
to 2007 in the journal Water Strategist. From this they
establish a large dataset of many states and regional
water markets. Through the analysis of water sales
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data, Basta and Colby ascertain trends in the water
market. Trends, such as total transactions, total quantity
traded, and average prices, aid in the understanding
in the valuation of water rights and the water market
itself. Almost all states and regions observed a general
trend of an increasing number of transactions in the
sale and lease of water rights, whereas New Mexico is
experiencing a growing leasing market instead of the
permanent sale of water rights. Leasing is a growing
market within California, Colorado, New Mexico, Texas,
and the Pacific Northwest Region. Prices are rising, with
a variance in prices between regions. This supports the
concept of the increased strain on the water supply,
especially in the Western United States. It also signifies
the importance to understand trends in the burgeoning
water market.
Watson and Davies (2011) examine regional
growth in the South Platte River Basin in Colorado to
understand the incentive structures for different users
if the water supply is fixed (2011). They examine the
demand of both agricultural and municipal water users,
finding that with an increasing population will strain the
water supplies and force water to be used for urban
user rather than irrigation. In addition, return flows from
municipal to agricultural users provide more water
for irrigation. Finally, they found the price of municipal
water to increase by 25 percent where the agricultural
price for water remained the same. This is likely due
to the increasing population within the region, which
subsequently increases the municipalities demand
for water; whereas, the demand from the agricultural
sector remains largely the same.
Yoskowitz (2001) looks at existing price
differentials in water market transactions in the Rio
Grande Valley in Texas. In order to understand this
phenomenon the article addresses the institutional
nature of the water markets. This is done by statistics
to show price differentials converging and diverging
over time among agricultural users and urban users.
In addition, Yoskowitz hypothesizes possible reasons
why price differentials occur. The results support a
differential price among different water users, and price
convergence has yet to occur.Yoskowitz (2001) attributes
price differentials to asymmetries in information and
the price elasticity of different water users. Yoskowitz
(2001) looks at price differentials between consumers
and represents the empirical model used to test if price
differentials occur.
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A. Summary of Literature
There are many challenges facing the current
water leasing markets. Broadbent et al. (2009) outlined
requirements necessary to ensure water-leasing markets
are efficient. These included well-defined water rights,
markets based upon hydrologic and engineering reality,
markets that protect environmental quality, community
and traditional uses, acknowledge transactions costs,
and address third-party effects. Basta and Colby (2010)
survey the current trends of water markets in the
Western United States and find a general increase in
the number of transactions of water rights through both
leasing and sales. While there have been many studies
done examining water leasing markets in the Western
United States (Yoskowitz 1999; Czetwertynski, 2002;
Yoskowitz, 2002; Loomis et al., 2003; Adams et al., 2004;
Howitt, 2005; Brown, 2006; Brewer et. al., 2007), very
few have examined the occurrence of price differentials
(Yoskowitz, 2001; Watson, 2011). These studies have
found price differentials occurring between agricultural
users and urban users.
III. THEORY
The design of the hypothetical water leasing
market draws upon experimental economics.
Experimental economics uses laboratory techniques
to test an economic theory. Essentially, experimental
economics induces values through the use of
participants to test a hypothesis. The data for this paper
was collected through a double auction experiment.
A double auction means that all bids and offers are
presented publicly and each bid and offer is presented
simultaneously.
Basic supply and demand theory is the
conceptual framework where the demand function is a
step demand function (Smith, 1982). The step demand
function occurs due to a differing market price value
between irrigators and municipalities. The flat region of
the demand curve in Figure 1 refers to the irrigators
demand for water. The marginal utility for municipalities
is higher than irrigators and therefore the left flat
region on the demand curve represents municipalities
demand for water (See Figure 1). Municipalities value
water rights at a higher price than irrigators because
there are a fixed number of water rights based upon
the hydrology of the basin and the supply of water is
perfectly inelastic. Users are not able to draw more
than their allotment of water, even when flows are high.
In times of a call the supply moves left and water prices
rise (See Figure 1). Water is only supplied to senior
users during a drought. Senior users are those with the
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oldest claim to the water. Junior users are those with
newer claims to the water and are the first to have their
water cut off during times of a drought.Therefore junior
users as well as the municipalities’ willingness to pay for
these rights will increase in times of drought.
Based upon the step demand function, during
times of a drought a price differential will occur between
senior and junior users if prices depend upon the users’
willingness to pay. Price differentials occur as a result
of differing marginal values between users. According
to Libecap (2005) price differentials still exist within
the water leasing market because of the infrequency
of trades. Libecap states, “Water trades take place and
are growing in frequency and magnitude, but they are
not sufficient to cause water prices to equalize on the
margin, adjusting for transport costs” (p. 39). Water
markets still face heavy regulations on the transfer of
water rights due to the interconnectedness of water
uses (Libecap, 2005).
IV. DATA
The data for this study comes from an
experimental water leasing market that was designed
for the Upper Mimbres Basin in southwestern New
Mexico. The two treatments used in this paper
to understand the impacts of a call under a prior
appropriations setting. The data collected from each
experiment measures a full years worth of transactions.
Conducting an experiment to test the feasibility of a
water leasing market was chosen primarily because of
a lack of data for the region. This data is appropriate
to measure the hypothesis because the experiment
induced values in which stakeholders first learned
about the subject matter and had a monetary incentive
to act in their best interest. In the Upper Mimbres Basin
there are eleven stakeholders.
The oldest priority date is 1869, which has a
yearly allocation of 789 acre-feet of water. This is the
senior user who has the most favorable water rights
during periods of drought, since they will be the last
to get their water cut off. There are four users with
the priority date of 1870 with an average allotment of
18 acre-feet of water. Following the four users of 1870,
there is one user with a priority date of 1880 with a
yearly allocation of 99 acre-feet. Then there is one user
with an 1893 priority date with a yearly allocation of
132 acre feet and two users with an 1894 priority date
with an average of 117 acre feet of water.The previously
mentioned users are currently using their water for
irrigation purchases but there are two municipalities

in the region interested in leasing water rights. The
water leasing market allows users to trade water each
month to address inefficiencies in the current water
allocation. Each trading round, which represents one
trading round, users are able to buy or sell water to
other users since this experiment is a double auction
and all prices posted to buy and sell water are visible to
all users.These trading decisions are then applied to the
hydrologic model, which factors in the affects on water
flow within the basin. Each month individual transactions
are recorded including the stakeholders involved in
the trade, the quantity of water traded, price of water
traded and the impacts on the hydrologic model.
IV. EMPIRICAL MODEL
In this study, two T-tests are done to measure
whether there is a statistical difference between the
following groups. Firstly, to investigate whether the
data collected reflects the expected market price.
Market price is determined through the experiment in
each round of trading. For each round of trading the
average price per quantity of water or market price was
determined. Expected price is the price per quantity
of water that should be elicited from the trading
rounds given the unique payout of each participant. The
expected market price was three dollars per acre-foot
of water as shown in Figure 1; the null hypothesis was
that market prices would not be equivalent to expected
prices. To test whether market prices were equivalent
to three dollars the following T-test was done.

Secondly, the study determines if a price
differential between senior and junior users during
times of a drought exists. Senior users’ price per
quantity of water should be higher than junior users in
times of a drought. To accomplish this, the average price
per quantity of the senior user’s water (1869 priority
date) in each round was compared to the price per
quantity of all other users (all other priority dates).
Both experiments were aggregated in an effort to
increase the sample size. The null hypothesis is: price is
not dependent upon priority date. The following T-test
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was done to see if there was a statistical significance
between priority dates.

V. RESULTS
The results proceed in four sections. First,
results are presented that compare the expected price
with the market price. Secondly, price differentials allow
for the comparison between priority dates. Thirdly,
the total number of transactions and, fourthly, the
call results of both experiments. These are necessary
comparisons when looking at the feasibility of a water
leasing market for any basin operating under the setting
of prior appropriations.
A. Market Prices
Descriptive statistics were used on the
experimental data to determine the average price per
acre-foot sold in every trading month (See Table 1).
As well as each priority dates average price per acrefoot (See Table 1). A T-test calculated to see whether
market prices were equivalent to the expected market
price of three dollars per acre-foot. Overall both
experiments found the market prices were equivalent
to the expected market price, except in times of a
call (See Table 1 and 2). Rejecting the null in times of
drought could be an indicator that price differentials
exist. In the first few months of both experiments the
null hypothesis can be accepted this is likely due to the
fact that users were adjusting to the market as well as
preemptively purchasing water in case of a call. This
means that participants for the most part did take on
their assigned role.
B. Price Differentials
The results of the first T-test indicate the
potential for price differentials. To determine whether
price differentials occur between the oldest priority date
and the rest of the priority dates, a second T-test was
performed. The T-test found that there was a statistical
difference between priority dates (See Table 4) and
that there was a lag in price differentials during times
of a drought. The high prices for the oldest priority date
occurred in the month following the beginning of the
drought and remained high the month after the drought
ended. The small sample size did affect the ability to
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test certain months, even with the aggregation of data
between the two experiments (See Table 3).
C. Total Number of Transactions
The total number of transactions in both
experiment one and two is displayed in Table 3. Table
3 illustrates how minute the water leasing market
is within the Upper Mimbres Basin, New Mexico. In
some rounds, there were only one or two transactions.
The small sample statistics indicate that an alternative
method may be needed to further test the hypothesis.
This can be done using a Willcoxon rank sum test.
D. Call Results
For both experiments, one and two, the
expected drought given the hydrologic model is seen in
Table 2.Without a water leasing market, the drought was
expected to occur in the months of July and August.The
drought in July would affect 1880, 1893, 1894, and in
August it would affect 1994 users. In both experiments
there is a decline in the severity and longevity of the
drought (See Table 2). In experiment one the drought
occurred in July and August and affected 1894 users
and the drought in experiment one occurred in July and
affected 1894 users. These results show that the water
leasing market allowed the participants to minimize the
impacts of a call and therefore trading was beneficial.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
Increased populations are adding pressure on
the already scarce water resources of the Western
United States. Establishing water-leasing markets within
basins that are well established in the hydrological
and engineering reality have the potential to increase
efficiencies. Through this experimental market, which
was modeled after an actual basin in New Mexico, the
benefits of water leasing can be seen. However, this
experiment data does reflect the expected outcome
of a water leasing market in terms of average price per
quantity of water.
In this study market prices overall were
equivalent to expected prices, with the exception of
months when there was a drought. Price differentials
between the oldest priority dates and the rest of the
priority dates do occur. Price differentials are a limiting
factor in implementing a water leasing market. Water is
not homogenous and thus price differentials might slow
the transaction process down and result in less water
allowed to the market, which in turn results in increased
prices and making the market less efficient. The results
of this study support results of previous studies
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(Yoskowitz, 2001; Libecap, 2005;Watson, 2011) of which
found price differentials between agricultural users and
urban users. Libecap (2005) explains “the persistence
of large price differentials between agricultural, urban,
and environmental users reflects the lack of extensive,
routine market trades that would otherwise arbitrage
to narrow the differences” (p. 4). Promoting widespread
use of water leasing markets should help eliminate price
differentials between users.
This study had very few transactions in certain
trading rounds. The thin market impacted the ability
to calculate a significance level as well as to compare
between priority dates. This led to an aggregation of
both experiments in order to test whether price
differentials occur between junior and senior users.
A Wilcoxon Rank Sum Test eliminates the concern
for a small sample size because it is a nonparametric
distribution free test. This would be an ideal way to
extend this study.
Establishing a water leasing market within this
particular basin has shown environmentally beneficial.
Due to the nature of the experiments, both trials had the
same expected outcome in terms of a drought. In both
experiments the length and severity of the expected
drought was reduced due to the reallocation of water
from the leasing of water. This displays the potential for
water leasing markets to reallocate resources in a more
efficient manner in regions where the Doctrine of Prior
Appropriations is the predominant water law.
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Figure 1: Step Demand Function

Table 1: Weighted Average Market Prices
Trading
Month
Market
Price
1894
1893
1880
1870
1869

Market
Price
1984

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

3.89**

3.91*

2.59+

4.5+

-1.06
2
0

-0.89
3
0

-0.65
2
0

0
0
0

3.5
-0.7
4.29
0
5
0
4
0

2.5
0
3.5
0
3
-1.06
4.43
-0.12

3.4
-0.29
3.5
0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
4.5
0

4.63*

3.9*

3.59*

3.5++

-0.82

-0.2

-0.27

3.5

3.5

0

0

May

Jun.

Jul.

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

Experiment 1
4
4.71**

5.5**

5.33*

3.71*

3.61

5+

0

-1
0
0

-1.15
0
0

-0.88
4.333
0

-0.25
3.5
0

-0.67
0
0

0
0
0

0
0
0

-1.29
0
0

5
0
0
0
3
4
0
0
4
7
0
0
0
5.4
0
-0.71
Experiment 2
3.17
3.61*

0
0
4
0
6
0
6
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
5.83
-0.23

4
0
0
0
0
0
3.6
-0.12

4
0
0
0
0
0
3.56
-0.75

0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

2.6+

2.8+

3++

3.33

0

0

0

-0.25

-0.32

-0.3

-0.19

0

-0.35

0

0

3.6

3.5

0

0

2.4

2.75

3

0

0

0

-0.3

0

0

0

-0.07

-0.23

0

0

0

0
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Table 1: Weighted Average Market Prices
1893
1880
1870
1869

4.5

4

3.5

3.5

3

3.33

3

3

3

3.33

0

0

-0.71

0

0

0

0

-0.47

0

0

0

-0.35

0

0

4

4

0

0

0

4

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

5.5

0

0

0

0

3.6

0

0

0

0

0

0

-0.71

0

0

0

0

-0.12

0

0

0

0

0

0

4

4

0

0

3.5

3.5

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

-0.47

0

0

0

0

0

0

*Denotes 0.05
**Denotes 0.10

+Denotes only one transaction
++ More than one transaction, no standard error

Table 2: Expect Versus Actual Affects of Drought
Year
Expected Affects of Drought
June
July
1869
1870
1880
X
1893
X
1894
X
Drought in Experiment 1
1869
1870
1880
1893
1894
X
X
Drought in Experiment 2
1869
1870
1880
1893
1894
X
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Table 3: Total Number of Trades
Trading Month
Scenario
No Stack/
Call #1
1894
1893
1880
1870
1869

Jan.
6

Feb.
7

Mar.
5

Apr.
1

May
3

Jun.
4

Jul.
3

Aug.
3

Sep.
7

Oct.
5

Nov.
1

Dec.
0

1
2
1
1
1

1
1
1
2
2

0
3
1
0
0

0
0
0
0
1

0
1
1
1
0

0
0
1
1
2

1
0
1
1
1

1
0
0
0
2

1
4
0
0
2

0
1
0
0
4

0
0
0
1
0

0
0
0
0
0

No Stack/
Call #2
1894
1893
1880
1870
1869

8

6

6

2

4

6

5

3

3

2

0

0

1
2
2
2
1

2
1
1
0
3

5
1
0
0
0

1
1
0
0
0

0
3
0
0
1

0
2
1
2
1

2
3
0
0
0

2
1
0
0
0

1
2
0
0
0

0
2
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

0
0
0
0
0

Table 4: Weighted Average Price by Priority Dates
Trading Month
Weighted
Avg. Price
1869
Priority
All Other
Priorities

1869
All Other
Priorities

Jan.

Feb.

Mar.

Apr.

May

Jun.

Jul.

Aug.

Sep.

Oct.

Nov.

Dec.

4

4.25*

0

4.5*

3.5+

4.86

6*

5.83*

3.6

3.56

0

0

0
4.35

-0.236
3.71

0
3.09

0
3.5

0
3.5

-1.258
3.88

0
3

-0.236
3.38

-0.118
3.58

-0.74
3.6

0
5

0
0

-1.047

-0.744

-0.499

-0.739

-0.496

-0.5

0

0

2
12

5
9

0
10

2
4

2
8

4
3

0
1

0
0

0
-0.837 -1.315 -1.252
Transactions by Priority Date
1
1
3
1
2
6
7
8

* Denotes 0.05 significance + Denotes only one transaction
** Denotes 0.10 significance
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